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Ryan Lang 
 
Land: If You Don’t Use It, You Lose It:  
Why Adverse Possession of Government Property is Necessary 
 
Section I 
Introduction 
It is often believed that land owned by the government cannot be acquired 
through adverse possession.  This is a fallacy however because although government land 
is typically immune from adverse possession vacant or underused land is not always 
afforded sovereign immunity.  This paper takes the point of view that it is not enough that 
only land owned by municipalities are subject to adverse possession.  All developed 
governmental land should be subject to adverse possession.  Many argue that it is 
important for a governmental entity to be immune from adverse possession due to how 
much land it owns, how expensive it would be to monitor the land, and how it would 
make it difficult for the government to buy land for the purpose of land speculation.  
Allowing adverse possession of developed government property would force the 
government to improve the maintenance of its property and lead to better utilization of 
property across the nation.  Furthermore, it is imperative that the United States protects 
the scarce amount of wild and undeveloped land left in the nation through creating 
stricter requirements to adversely possess undeveloped land.   
The particular issue discussed in this paper is that the time has come to strip the 
United States government and state governments of sovereign immunity from the adverse 
possession of developed land while making it more difficult to adversely possess 
undeveloped lands.  The reason I chose to focus on the adverse possession of government 
 2 
property as well as the need to protect wild and undeveloped lands is that there is unused 
developed property that needs to be put back into circulation.  There is a desire to utilize 
the land efficiently and to make the most of property but this desire cannot be allowed to 
come at the expense of the scarce amount of undeveloped land in this country.    
This paper will address various topics regarding the adverse possession of 
government property in the following order: Section II will discuss the background of 
adverse possession, Section III will discuss why the government should not be immune 
from adverse possession, Section IV will discuss the arguments supporting governmental 
immunity from adverse possession with rebuttals to those arguments, and Section V will 
discuss the need to protect and preserve the scarce amount of wild and undeveloped land 
in the United States.  
Section II 
Adverse Possession 
Adverse possession is a doctrine that allows trespassers to transform from 
possessor to true owner of privately owned property if the owner fails to expel the 
trespassers before the end of the statutory period usually before the statute of limitations.  
In order to adversely possess the trespasser is required by the statute to use the property 
as if it were its own for a specific amount of time.  Once the required amount of time has 
passed under the statute of limitations the doctrine of adverse possession prevents the 
original owner from bringing lawsuits in an attempt to recover the land while also 
creating a new title for the trespasser.   
 3 
The common law requires that the trespasser’s possession must be “actual, open, 
continuous, notorious, exclusive, and under color or claim of right.”1  Different state 
statutes may require more from the adverse possessor, such as a requirement to have paid 
all state and local property taxes during the period of trespassing, while others require the 
land to be “protected by a substantial inclosure” or “cultivated or improved” in the usual 
way.
2
  Of the universal elements of adverse possession, the first element requires that 
there is actual possession of physical property and that the trespasser utilizes the land in a 
way that a reasonable owner would.
3
  The open and notorious element requires the 
trespasser’s possession to be so blatant that it could be detected upon inspection of the 
property and that upon inspection a reasonable owner would be aware of the trespassers 
use of his land.
4
  The exclusive possession element requires that the trespasser have sole 
possession of the land and not be the land with the titleholder or the general public; 
however, this element is loosely enforced throughout courts.
5
  The fourth element is the 
requirement that the possession be adverse, meaning that it must be under color or claim 
of right; however, many courts require that the trespasser use the land and acts as if she 
were the true owner without the permission of the title holder.
6
  The last element is that 
the use by the adverse possessor must be continuous and without interruption throughout 
the time set forth in the statute of limitations.
7
  A landowner is allowed to bring a claim 
                                                        
1
 See Mackinac Island Dev. Co., Ltd. v. Burton Abstract & Title Co., 504, 349 N.W.2d 191, 195 
(Mich. App. 1984). 
2
 See MINN. STAT. ANN. S 541.02 (West 1998); Mont. Code Ann. S 70-19-411 (1995); NEV. REV. 
STAT. ANN. S 11.150 (Michie 1996); UTAH CODE ANN. S 78-12-12 (1992); N.Y. Real Prop. Acts. 
Law S 512, 522 (McKinney 1979).   
3
 See JOHN G. SPRANKLING, UNDERSTANDING PROPERTY LAW 436 (2000). 
4
 See SPRANKLING, supra note 3, at 438. 
5
 Id. at 440. 
6
 Id. at 442; at 441-44. 
7
 Id. at 444-45. 
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for ejectment, a civil action to recover the possession of or title to land, at any time until 
the statute of limitations for adverse possession is exceeded.
8
  If a trespasser meets all of 
the elements required for adverse possession, they obtain title in fee, which grants the 
possessor title of the land from the rightful owner.  After the statutory period runs and the 
adverse possessor takes claim, the prior landowner is not allowed to bring claims for any 
remedies.
9
   
Adverse possession’s roots date all the way back to early Roman and Feudal 
Law.
10
  The doctrine developed throughout England around 1275 to prevent the waste of 
land granted to the people by the king.
11
  The doctrine of adverse possession was 
originally created to prevent costly legal disputes over property while forcing owners to 
monitor their property and to utilize their property.
12
  With adverse possession came 
about sovereign immunity against adverse possession as a way of protecting the king, 
who was too busy working for the benefit of his subjects to care for and protect his 
land.
13
 This sovereign immunity against the statutes of adverse possession is termed 
“nullum tempus occurrit regi,” meaning “time does not run against the king.”14  This 
English doctrine was adopted by all states in America and was adopted by all states as a 
way to cure title disputes it established a twenty-year statute of limitations before 
adversely possessing the property.
15
  The desire to develop as much land as possible of 
                                                        
8
 See SPRANKLING, supra note 3, at 438. 
9
 Id. 
10
Id. 
11
See Brian Gardiner, Comment, Squatters’ Rights and Adverse Possession: A Search for 
Equitable Application of Property Laws, 8 IND. INT’LL & COMP. L. REV. 119, 125-26 (1997). 
12
 Id. at 126-27. 
13
 See Devins v. Borough of Bogota, 592 A.2d 199, 202 (N.J. 1991). 
14
 See Devins v. Bogota, 592 A.2d at 202.  
15
 See SPRANKLING, supra note 3, at 437; Gardiner, supra note 11, at 129. 
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land in America has since led to a decrease of the statute of limitations in many states to 
as few as five years; however, some statutes of limitations have remained as long as forty 
years.
16
  Like England before it, the United States also adopted a version of “nullum 
tempus occurrit regi” and adapted the sovereign immunity to apply to land of government 
entities since our government does not have a king.
17
   
There is not a uniformity of adverse possession laws in the United States; rather 
each state has their own adverse possession laws.
18
  The New Jersey court system 
displayed the confusion and chaos of adverse possession laws across the nation.
19
  New 
Jersey had been applying the adverse possession laws incorrectly for over fifty years.
20
  
The court in J & M Land Co. v. First Nat. Bank held that New Jersey courts had been 
incorrectly applying a twenty-year statute of limitations for the entry of a judgment for 
adverse possession for the past fifty years.
21
  The pertinent statute in the New Jersey, 
N.J.S.A. 2A:14-30 provided that: 
 Thirty years actual possession of any real estate excepting woodlands or 
uncultivated tracts, and 60 years’ actual possession of woodlands or 
uncultivated tracts, uninterruptedly continued by occupancy, descent, 
conveyance, or otherwise, shall, in whatever way or manner such 
possession might have commenced or have been continued, vest a full and 
complete right and title in every actual possessor or occupier of such real 
                                                        
16
 See William G. Ackerman & Shane T. Johnson, Comment, Outlaws of the Past: A Western 
Perspective on Prescription and Adverse Possession, 31 LAND & WATER L. REV. 79, 111-12 
(1996).  
17
 See Devins v. Bogota, 592 A.2d at 202. 
18
 See J & M Land Co. v. First Union Nat. Bank, 166 N.J. 493, 500, 766 A.2d 1110, 1113 (2001). 
19
 Id. 
20
 Id. 
21
 Id. at 1126. 
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estate, woodlands or uncultivated tracts, and shall be a good and sufficient 
bar to all claims that may be made or actions commenced by any person 
whatsoever for the recovery of any such real estate, woodlands or 
uncultivated tracts.
22
 
Therefore, the New Jersey court system displayed how confusing the lack 
of national uniformity for adverse possession laws can be.
23
  New Jersey applied 
the wrong statute of limitations for the entry of a judgment for adverse possession, 
a twenty year period instead of the correct thirty and sixty year period, for over 
fifty years before correcting the oversight.
24
 
Municipal land is not always granted immunity from adverse possession.
25
  In 
jurisdictions where municipal land is not immune against adverse possession, there are 
limitations as to how the land can be adversely possessed.
26
  The first way in which 
jurisdictions limit the adverse possession of municipal land is by requiring that the land 
be used for public use.
27
  Some of these jurisdictions deny adverse possession claims 
against municipal land if the municipality can prove that the land will be used for a public 
use, such as a school, street, highway or hospital.
28
  Other jurisdictions put the burden of 
proof on the adverse possessor to prove both that the land was not currently being utilized 
for public use and that the municipality did not have plans to utilize the land for public 
                                                        
22
 See J & M Land Co. v. First Union Nat. Bank, 166 A. 2d at 1113. 
23
 Id. 
24
 Id. 
25
 See Carl C. Risch, Encouraging the Responsible Use of Land by Municipalities: The Erosion of 
Nullum Tempus Occurrit Regi and the Use of Adverse Possession Against Municipal Land 
Owners, 99 DICK. L. REV. 197, 200 n.24 (1994).   
26
 Id. at 200-09. 
27
 Id.  
28
 Id. 
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use in the future.
29
  The second way in which jurisdictions limit the adverse possession of 
municipal land is by requiring that the land be held in a proprietary versus a 
governmental capacity, attempting to protect the land utilized for governmental 
purposes.
30
   
In sum, property owned by the federal government or by state governments is not 
subject to adverse possession and most municipalities that are subject to adverse 
possession find a way to circumvent adverse possession through amending their statutes 
and requirements.
31
  No developed land owned by the government should be immune to 
adverse possession for the reasons listed in Section III. 
Section III 
Why the Government Should Not Be Immune From Adverse Possession  
 Allowing adverse possession of developed land owned by the government 
incentivizes the government to use land productively and helps to ensure that government 
land is put to a valuable use while also ensuring that the developed property throughout 
our nation is utilized in a beneficial manner.
32
  There are many theories that will be 
discussed in this argument that support a general justification of adverse possession of 
                                                        
29
 See Risch, supra note 25, at 215. 
30
 Id. 
31
 Id. 
32
 See SPRANKLING, supra note 3, at 831-33; Thomas J. Miceli & C.F. Sirmons, An Economic 
Theory of Adverse Possession, 15 INT’L REV. L. ECON. 161, 164 (1995).   
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developed government property, mainly the “efficient land use” theory, the “personhood 
model,” the Hegelian Theory, and the Locke’s “labor theory”.33 
The justification for sovereign immunity of the government “nullum tempus 
occurrit regi” has run its course in America.34  This notion should no longer apply to 
governmental adverse possession in our nation and should be abandoned as it has in 
criminal law, tort law, and contract law.
35
  Abolishing the government’s sovereign 
immunity against the adverse possession of its land would force the government to either 
use and take advantage of the land it possesses or at the very least monitor and maintain 
its property.
36
   
It is nearly impossible for United States citizens to know when their government 
is acting in a lazy and lackadaisical manner that is hurting the general public.
37
  Allowing 
adverse possession of government property would showcase and highlight the 
government’s failure to utilize its land efficiently or to sufficiently monitor its land.38  If 
the general public of this nation knew that the government was failing to minimally 
monitor its land it would put pressure on the government to utilize its land efficiently.
39
  
As stated, since there is a statute of limitations no shorter than five years for any state and 
                                                        
33
 See Jeffrey Evans Stake, The Uneasy Case for Adverse Possession, 89 GEO. L.J. 2419, 2436 
(2001); Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 476-77 (1987); Justin 
Hughes, The Philosophy of Intellectual Property, 77 GEO. L.J. 287, 333 (1988); JOHN LOCKE, 
THE SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT § 27 (J.W. Gough ed., Oxford 1976) (1679). 
34
 See Andrew Shepard, Adverse Possession, Private-Zoning Waiver & Desuetude: Abandonment 
& Recapture of Property and Liberty Interests, 44 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 557, 559 (2011).   
35
 See United States v. Hoar, 26 F. Cas. 329, 330 (C.C. Mass. 1821); Developments in the Law: 
Statutes of Limitations, 63 HARV. L. REV. 1177, 1252 (1950). 
36
 See SHEPARD, supra note 34, at 559. 
37
 See e.g. Johnathan R. Macey, Cynicism and Trust in Politics and Constitutional Theory, 87 
CORNELL L. REV. 280, 290 (2002). 
38
 See SHEPARD, supra note 34, at 280. 
39
 Id. 
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as long as 60 years in some states, this monitoring of land by the government would not 
be as burdensome or expensive as many fear.
40
  In fact, this monitoring would be 
relatively cheap and would encourage municipalities, states, and the federal government 
to use their land in an advantageous manner for its citizens.
41
  Government land that is 
put to a valuable use has direct benefits to society because it would bring about nature 
preserves, post offices, fire departments, schools, and parks.
42
  This proper utilization of 
the land creates a public policy argument in support of the adverse possession of 
developed government land.
43
  The court in Devins v. Borough of Bogota recognized the 
benefit of putting pressure on the government to use their property productively through 
adverse possession.
44
 In Devins the Borough of Bogota owned property that the plaintiff-
appellants had paved and been using as a parking lot for more than the requisite twenty 
years needed for the entry of a judgment for adverse possession.
45
  The issue in Devins 
was whether the land owned by the Borough of Bogota, municipal land, was subject to 
adverse possession.
46
  The court in ruled that municipal land neither dedicated nor used 
for a public purpose is subject to acquisition by adverse possession.
47
  The court in 
Devins stated:  
Underlying our belief (that municipally owned land not dedicated or used 
for a public purpose should be subject to adverse possession) is the 
perception that we are not imposing an undue burden on municipalities by 
                                                        
40
 Id. 
41
 See Walter Quentin Impert, Whose Land Is It Anyway?: It's Time to Reconsider Sovereign 
Immunity from Adverse Possession, 49 UCLA L. REV. 447, 452-453 (2001). 
42
 Id. 
43
 Id. 
44
 See Devins v. Bogota, 592 A.2d at 203.   
45
 Id. at 200. 
46
 Id. 
47
 Id. 
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expecting them to discover within the relevant period of limitations what 
property they own and who possesses it.  That expectation will encourage 
municipalities to make efficient use of their property… Conversely, we 
are reluctant to adopt a policy that would encourage municipalities not to 
use, dedicate, or even identify their property.
48
   
This demonstrates that the court believed the benefits of the government using its land 
productively outweigh the burden of costs associated with allowing the adverse 
possession of government property.
49
   
 Allowing adverse possession of government property would have many beneficial 
economic effects.
50
  Forcing property owners, including the government, to utilize or 
monitor their land to avoid adverse possession would ensure that property owners could 
not be wholly absent.
51
  This would make negotiation over the land more likely; and 
allowing the land to be adversely possessed would force the property owner to assert her 
right to exclude, which could include receiving offers to purchase the land, creating a 
market for that land.
52
  Moreover, adverse possession gives the adverse possessor title to 
the property, meaning that the possessor will be free to use the land as she likes.
53
  
Adverse possession forever bars the original property owner from bringing suit for title 
against the adverse possessor, which allows the adverse possessor to avoid any litigation 
and be free to sell the property.
54
  Accordingly, allowing adverse possession of developed 
                                                        
48
 See SHEPARD, supra note 34, at 280. 
49
 See Paula R. Latovick, Adverse Possession of Municipal Land: It’s Time to Protect this 
Valuable Asset, 31 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 475, 482-83 (1998). 
50
 See Thomas Merrill, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Adverse Possession, 79 NW. U. L. 
REV. 1122, 1130 (1984). 
51
 Id. 
52
 Id. 
53
 Id.  
54
 Id. 
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government land creates alienability of the land, which in turn creates an economic 
market for that land.
55
 
 There are also various public policy theories in favor of adverse possession 
against the immunity of government land, one of which is the “efficient land use” 
theory.
56
  The “efficient land use” theory is based upon the fact that adverse possession 
promotes the efficient use of land.
57
  The efficient land use theory rewards the trespasser 
for putting the land to good use.
58
  This justification was more relevant during times 
where there was a lot of land across the nation and all states wanted to encourage the 
development of the land.
59
  Although times have changed and land is less abundant there 
is still a lot of land that goes unused each year in the United States, much of which is 
owned by the government.
60
  Furthermore, the efficient land use rationale theory of 
adverse possession acts to deter owners from buying large areas of land that they leave 
vacant and to punish owners who do not take advantage of their property rights via 
development.
61
  At the very least the efficient land use rationale encourages landowners 
to monitor and maintain their property, which could help to keep property in good 
condition and preserve land throughout this nation.
62
   
                                                        
55
 See Merrill, supra note 50, at 1154. 
56
 See Stake, supra note 33, at 2436 
57
 Id. 
58
 Id.  
59
 See John G. Sprankling, The Antiwilderness Bias in American Property Law, 63 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 519, 539-40 (1996).  
60
 Id. 
61
 See William C. Marra, Adverse Possession, Takings, and the State, 89 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 
1, 17 (2011). 
62
 See Stake, supra note 33, at 2436. 
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Another policy theory in support of adverse possession of developed government 
land is the “personhood model.” 63   This theory emphasizes that adverse possessors 
typically have a more personal attachment to the land than the actual owner because they 
have lived on and utilized the land throughout the entirety of the statute of limitations.
64
  
Due to this attachment the adverse possessor is more likely to use the property for 
beneficial purposes and make the most out of the land.
65
  The true owner has essentially 
abandoned the land whereas the adverse possessor has spent the time and effort it is only 
appropriate to give the title of that land to the person with the strongest personal 
attachment to the land.
66
  This is no different for government land.  When one adversely 
trespasses openly and notoriously and has actual and exclusive possession of the property 
continuously for the statutory period, they become more attached to that land than the 
actual owner, whether that owner happens to be the government or a private citizen.
67
 
The Hegelian Theory, similar to the “efficient land use” theory and the 
“personhood model,” emphasizes that there is a relationship between a landowner and her 
property.
68
  This theory stresses that a landowner expresses his freedom and will through 
owning his property and occupying the property.
69
  The theme in this theory is that the 
property and the landowner are one entity, that they have a relationship which highlights 
                                                        
63
 See JESSE DUKEMINIER & JAMES E. KRIER, PROPERTY 139 (5
th
 ed. 2002); JOHN P. DWYER & 
PETER S. MENELL, PROPERTY LAW AND POLICY: A COMPARATIVE INSTITUTIONAL PERSPECTIVE 
76 & n.1 (David L. Shapiro et al. eds., 1998); Holmes, supra note 33, at 477; Margaret Jane 
Radine, Time, Possession and Alienation, 64 WASH. U. L.Q. 739, 748-49 (1986).   
64
 See Holmes, supra note 33, at 476-77. 
65
 Id. 
66
 Id. 
67
 See DUKEMINIER & KRIER, supra note 63, at 139. 
68
 See Hughes, supra note 33, at 333.  
69
 Id. 
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the landowners need to own and occupy property to exercise his free will and the 
property needs the landowner to utilize the property.
70
   
Additionally, John Locke’s “labor theory” puts forth that a lands value is based 
solely on the labor that goes into that property and therefore he who puts the value into 
the land should own the object.
71
  Locke emphasized the importance of utilizing land and 
laboring over the land to truly bring the value out of the land, he stated “tis labour indeed 
that puts the difference on value on every thing.”72  Thus, John Locke’s “labor theory” 
accentuates that a laborer should gain rights to property when they labor over the 
property because they are essentially creating the value of the property.
73
 
The notion of allowing adverse possession of developed government property 
across the United States is supported by the “efficient land use” theory, the “personhood 
model” theory, the Hegelian theory, and Locke’s “labor theory.”74  A very clear example 
that emphasizes all four of these theories took place when New York City failed to 
monitor 2,000 of its vacant buildings in the mid-1990s.
75
  In these vacant buildings there 
were some 17,000 individual dwelling units, some had been vacant for decades.
76
 New 
York City not only failed to monitor the vacant buildings that they owned throughout the 
city but they failed to even be aware that they owned many of these buildings.
77
  In many 
                                                        
70
 See Hughes, supra note 33, at 333. 
71
 See LOCKE, supra note 33.  
72
 Id. 
73
 Id. 
74
 LOCKE, supra note 33; See Holmes, supra note 33, at 476-77; Hughes, supra note 33 at 333; 
Stake, supra note 33, at 2436. 
75
 See Brian Gardiner, Squatter’s Rights and Adverse Possession: A Search for Equitable 
Applications of Property Law, 8 IND. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 119, 144 (1997) (reviewing 
development of adverse-possession doctrine in Britain). 
76
 Id.   
77
 Id. 
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areas these vacant buildings became the home of many vagrants and eventually also 
became home to drug dealers and vandals.
78
  On the Lower East Side, however, a squatter 
community took over many of these buildings and the communities that the squatters 
took over “became thriving, freestanding communities of otherwise law-abiding 
citizens…. Those squatters often took buildings that were eyesores and public nuisances 
at best – and were often dire threats to public safety – and transformed them into clean, 
renovated, and functioning housing.”79 This story is so germane because it shows how the 
lack of governmental monitoring negatively affect a neighborhood while also exposing 
the benefits adverse possession can bring to a similar neighborhood.
80
   
This anecdote displays the theory behind the “efficient land use” theory because 
the squatters who took over the buildings on the Lower East Side took decrepit vacant 
apartment buildings that were eyesores in their neighborhoods and turned them into 
beautiful, well-maintained apartment buildings.
81
  It further exhibits the theory behind the  
“personhood model” because it is apparent that the adverse possessors had more 
attachment to the property than the original titleholder did.
82
  Moreover, it supports the 
Hegelian Theory because it proves that those who occupy property form a bond and a 
relationship with the property that allows an individual to express her will and freedom.
83
 
                                                        
78
 See Gregory M. Duhl, Property and Custom: Allocating Space in Public Places, 79 TEMP. L. 
REV. 199, 242 (2006) (noting mass abandonment of privately owned buildings in New York City 
in the 1970s and 1980s). 
79
 See Eduardo Moisés Peñalver & Sonia K. Katyal, Property Outlaws, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 1095, 
1123-25 (2007) (recounting New York and Philadelphia’s incompetence in dealing with these 
properties).   
80
 See Peñalver & Katyal supra note 79, at 1123-1125. 
81
 See Duhl, supra note 78, at 242; Peñalver supra note 79, at 1123-1125; Stake, supra note 33, at 
2436. 
82
 See Duhl, supra note 78, at 242; Holmes, supra note 33, at 476-77; Peñalver & Katyal supra 
note 79, at 1123-1125; 
83
 See Hughes, supra note 33, at 333.  
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Lastly, it supports Locke’s “labor theory” by allowing the squatters who put the labor 
into turning abandoned structures into making beautiful buildings in a thriving 
neighborhood to live their and enjoy the value of their labor.  The adverse possessors, in 
this case the squatters, showed their affection and attachment and proved that those who 
are more attached to their land are more likely to put their land to beneficial use.
84
  This 
example proves that there is an opportunity for many thriving communities to grow and 
flourish across the nation if squatters were able to adversely possess land that the 
government has abandoned and forgotten about.   
In conclusion, abolishing the government’s sovereign immunity from adverse 
possession would result in many beneficial effects on land across the nation.  The next 
section, Section IV, will discuss the arguments for governmental immunity from adverse 
possession and counterarguments of why those arguments fail to prove that governmental 
immunity is necessary. 
Section IV 
Arguments For Governmental Immunity From Adverse Possession 
 The justifications for the government’s immunity to adverse possession of its land 
do not outweigh the benefits. Many of the arguments in favor of sovereign immunity 
against adverse possession of government land fail to take into consideration the purpose 
and benefits associated with adverse possession.  One argument in favor of governmental 
immunity is that government property should not be able to be adversely possessed 
                                                        
84
 See Duhl, supra note 78, at 242; Peñalver & Katyal supra note 79; supra note 79, at 1123-25; 
Holmes, supra note 33, at 476-77. 
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because the land is inalienable.
85
  Not all government land is inalienable, however, and 
although there may be limitations on the ability of municipalities to sell the land, 
governing bodies and the legislature have the power to convey the land.
86
  This argument 
further fails to distinguish the difference between governmental property and privately 
owned property.
87
  Privately owned property in certain situations is also inalienable, such 
as a situation where a landowner rents the property to a third party with alienability 
restrictions, yet there is not adverse possession immunity in these situations.
88
  
Furthermore, simply because land is inalienable does not mean that the land is being used 
productively, the main justification for adverse possession.
89
 
 Another justification for governmental immunity against adverse possession is 
that the unauthorized use of government property constitutes a nuisance and therefore 
adverse possessors of government property should be punished rather than rewarded.  
This argument does not take into consideration the fact that the land is being used 
beneficially and will likely benefit the community by making use out of land that has 
likely been abandoned and unkempt.
90
 Adverse possession requires that the trespasser’s 
possession must be open and notorious, meaning that if their presence was creating a 
nuisance or constituted a nuisance, it was not bothering the government nor the 
community enough for anyone to acknowledge or complain about their presence.
91
  
Additionally, even if the use of the land was unlawful, the whole premise behind adverse 
                                                        
85
 See Messersmith v. Mayor & Common Council of Riverdale, 164 A.2d 523, 525 (Md. 1960); 
Latovick, supra note 49, at 495. 
86
 See Latovick, supra note 49, at 483-84.  
87
 See Quentin, supra note 41 at 453.  
88
 See McClelland v. Miller, 28 OHIO ST. 488, 502 (1876); Latovick, supra note 49, at 484-85 
89
 See Quentin, supra note 41, at 453. 
90
 Id. 
91
 See Mackinac Island Dev. Co., 349 N.W.2d at 195. 
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possession is based upon illegality; the use of the land must be adverse.
92
  If the owner 
permitted the possession and use of the land then the possessor cannot adversely possess 
and the doctrine of adverse possession would not exist, thus the nuisance argument 
fails.
93
 
 Others believe that government land bought for the purpose of investment should 
not be allowed to be adversely possessed because the government buys that land to let it 
remain untouched and gain value.
94
  The government typically buys land outside of 
upcoming cities or areas where the government foresees eventual growth in order to 
eventually develop or sell the land.
95
  In this situation the government has the same duty 
as a private developer would to monitor their property and deter any adverse possessors.
96
  
Monitoring land bought for investment and development does not require constant 
monitoring or even monthly monitoring because adverse possession must be continuous 
and the statute of limitations for adverse possession typically runs over a few years.
97
  In 
fact, with new technology the cost of monitoring land has plummeted over the last few 
decades.
98
  The government can now monitor land in an economical manner via 
photograph, video, or through satellite use if necessary.
99
  The threat of adverse 
possession would also incentivize the government to develop and use its land within a 
reasonable time after purchasing the property, not neglecting or failing to utilize this 
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country’s scarce land and resources.100  This is not to say that the undeveloped land in 
this nation must be utilized, in fact, it will be argued below that there must be 
environmental protection of undeveloped land.
101
  In sum, there would be little to no cost 
involved in the government checking on their investment land every so often to ensure 
that there is no threat of adverse possession so there is no reason why the government 
should be treated any different than a developer in terms of adverse possession of land 
bought for investment.
102
 
 Many argue that the costs that would be associated with allowing governmental 
adverse possession warrant the immunity afforded to the government’s property.  When 
someone loses property due to adverse possession they do not receive compensation for 
the value of their land.
103
  This could seemingly be a problem for the government if it 
were to lose large amounts of land without receiving compensation.
104
  The problem with 
this argument is that the government does receive a compensation of sorts once the land 
is adversely possessed because the adverse possessor must pay the taxes associated with 
owning land.
105
  Although the compensation from taxation is minimal, the government 
does not collect any taxes when long-term trespassers enjoy the exclusive use of 
government property without paying taxes on the land, essentially receiving the benefits 
of land ownership without paying taxes to the government.
106
  The land that is typically 
adversely possessed is land that the government does not use and has not monitored 
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throughout the statute of limitations so it is safe to assume that the government did not 
greatly value the land and was not receiving benefits from owning it.
107
  Although the 
property taxes are less than if the government had sold the property, the benefit they 
receive outweighs the benefit of allowing trespassers to use the property without granting 
any benefit to the government.
108
  Furthermore, this could put pressure on the 
government to sell more of their land before it could be adversely possessed, which 
would give money back to the government and allow for the beneficial use of more 
land.
109
  In conclusion, when land is adversely possessed the government receives land 
taxes paid by the adverse possessor, a benefit that the government does not receive when 
long-term trespassers use government property.   
 There are also property theories that support sovereign immunity of government 
property from adverse possession.  The Hegelian theory of property suggests that 
property is an expression of the self and that property rights are important to keep 
property owners from constant conflict over their property in order to protect their self-
actualization.
110
  The Hegelian Theory implies that property is an expression of will and 
part of the landowner’s personality and that if the property is secure then the owner is 
free to pursue freedom and develop a stronger personality and will.
111
  This theory looks 
to protect the relationship between a landowner and her property but also emphasizes that 
the relationship is fluid and that because a landowner must express the will to possess the 
land someone who fails to do so can “lose possession of property through 
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prescription.”112  On one hand the Hegelian Theory protects the rights of the original 
landowner, but on the other hand it stresses that an individual must occupy the land 
through “physically seizing it, imposing a form upon it, and marking it.”  This theory 
expresses that marking property is similar to using property in that it expresses an 
individual’s will to utilize and enjoy the property.113  Thus, although the Hegelian Theory 
emphasizes the importance of the freedom a landowner achieves in owning property, the 
importance of a landowner’s property rights, and the importance of a landowners 
relationship with the property as an expression of will, it still stresses the need for 
someone who fails to use property to lose possession of that property through 
prescription.
114
  Therefore, the Hegelian Theory would seem to support the need for 
adverse possession against developed government property that is not utilized or 
maintained.
115
 
 There is also an argument to be made that sovereign immunity of government 
land from adverse possession is necessary to protect the wild and undeveloped land in the 
United States.
116
  This argument is not disputed and in fact should be taken even further 
to the point where all wild and undeveloped land must be more difficult to adversely 
possess than it currently is.
117
  This will be argued further below.   
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Section V 
The Need to Protect Wild and Undeveloped Land 
The strongest justification for governmental immunity from adverse possession is 
that much of government property is held in an environmental capacity.
118
 Many believe 
that the concern for protecting the environment outweighs the desire to maximize the 
productive use of land.
119
 Although an adverse possessor uses vacant land productively, 
making the most out of land, land in its natural state is scarce and adverse possession of 
this land would diminish the amount of natural land.
120
  There are many undeveloped 
areas that the government leaves in its natural state such as state parks, state forests, 
green belts, national parks and forests, and many nature preserves.
121
  Adverse possession 
must balance efficient land use with environmental concerns, and when one or the other 
leans too heavily against the other it is the role of the legislature and government to 
remedy this concern.
122
  Protecting those undeveloped areas does not go far enough, there 
must be stricter regulations when it comes to the requirements needed to adversely 
possess natural and undeveloped lands.
123
 
It is seen as a goal of many that undeveloped land in this nation must be protected 
through sovereign immunity to ensure that the scarce natural land remains intact and well 
preserved.
124
  The problem is that it is much easier to adversely possess undeveloped 
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lands than it is to adversely possess commercial, residential, or agricultural land.
125
  In 
the nineteenth century the country was attempting to develop as much land as possible for 
economic purposes and therefore did not value forests, deserts, wetlands, swamps, and 
other undeveloped lands, something Sprankling termed the “development model.”126  
This lack of economic value based on natural land led to more lenient requirements 
needed to adversely possess undeveloped land.
127
  Judges have awarded undeveloped 
land via adverse possession for possessors who have simply engaged in harvesting hay; 
gathering firewood; seasonal stock grazing; occasional cattle grazing; removal of leaf 
mold; limited clear cutting; picnicking; limited timber cutting; marking boundaries; 
erecting a fence; clearing roads; and hunting and hiking.
128
  Theorists have justified 
adverse possession of this undeveloped land because it is impossible to build houses or 
farm on the land so it is impossible to improve the land in a beneficial manner.
129
  
Furthermore, due to the inaccessibility of many wild lands courts refuse to enforce the 
open and notorious aspect and constructive and actual knowledge aspect normally 
required for adverse possession.
130
  The attempt to allow those who will utilize the 
                                                        
125
 See Ewing v. Burnett, 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 41, 49, 52-53 (1837); DUKEMINIER & KRIER, supra 
note 63, at 139-40; Sprankling, supra note 116, at 831-33 (collecting cases).   
126
 See Sprankling, supra note 59, at 840, 843-49. 
127
 See Ewing, 36 U.S. at 41, 49; DUKEMINIER & KRIER, supra note 63, at 139-40; Sprankling, 
supra note 116, at 831-33 (collecting cases). 
128
 See Weiss v. Meyer, 303 N.W.2d 765, 770 (Neb. 1981); Evans v. Lux, 201 N.Y.S. 161, 167 
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1923); Thompson v. Hayslip, 600 N.E.2d 756, 759 (Ohio Ct. App. 1991); Stowell 
v. Swift, 576 A.2d 204, 205 (Me. 1990).   
129
 See 16 POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY, § 91.01[2] (Michael Allan Wolf ed., Matthew Bender 
2005). 
130
 Alexandra B. Klass, Adverse Possession and Conservation: Expanding Traditional Notions of 
Use and Possession, 77 U. COLO. L. REV. 283, 293 (2006) 
 23 
property to claim title to the property through adverse possession has led to too lenient 
requirements to adversely possess undeveloped land.
131
   
The relaxed standards needed for the adverse possession of undeveloped land are 
problematic for many reasons.  Professor John G. Sprankling described the “development 
model” and “anti-wilderness bias” that led to easier adverse possession of undeveloped 
land as anti-environmental and stated that it should not longer have a place in today’s 
world where we should be placing higher value on conserving our natural and 
undeveloped land.
132
  When asked in survey research Americans stated that they believed 
there should be stronger efforts made by our government to protect our natural land and 
that it is everyone’s obligation to do so and that everyone should have access to outdoor 
recreation areas.
133
  Furthermore, Americans believed that more land should be 
designated for protection of historical landscapes, national parks, and for rare and 
endangered species.
134
  In 2001 state and local ballot proposals displayed that voters 
wanted more natural land as 137 out of 196 proposals promoting natural were approved 
resulting in funding for $1.7 million for natural land conservation and parks.
135
  This 
desire to preserve and conserve land is contrary to the current leniency allowed to adverse 
possessors of undeveloped land and highlights why courts must refine the adverse 
possession requirements necessary to adversely possess this undeveloped land.
136
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Although there have been many conservation easements agreed to recently that 
protect millions of acres of wild lands and undeveloped land there are still millions of 
acres of wild lands that are not protected by conservation easements.
137
  These easements 
protect wild and undeveloped land by granting a deed or conservation that guarantees the 
rights of the grantee to “protect natural, scenic, historic, agricultural, forest, or open space 
values” and prohibits uses including “subdivision and development, commercial uses, 
alteration of land surface, mineral development, timber harvesting, signs, utility lines, or 
interference with natural resources such as wetlands, ponds, streams, wildlife, and 
wildlife habit.”138  The land not protected by such easements is still susceptible to adverse 
possession.  Some courts have found creative ways to protect undeveloped land and more 
courts must adhere to these methods and find a way to protect and conserve this land.
139
 
These courts have found that use of undeveloped land is permissive and thus not adverse, 
that improvements and developments on wild lands is not open or notorious, and that the 
owners can not detect or prevent those using undeveloped land and thus it is deemed 
permissive.
140
  These courts, still in the minority in terms of state law, impose a higher 
standard rather than a lower standard in order to adversely possess wild and undeveloped 
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land.
141
  This raised standard or simply just not a lowered standard of adverse possession 
could go a long way in limiting the amount of undeveloped and natural land that is 
developed and protect a scarce resource in this nation.    
Section VI 
Conclusion 
 The purpose of this paper has been to discuss the fact that government’s 
developed land should not be afforded sovereign immunity from adverse possession and 
that all undeveloped land should require the same elements as adverse possession of 
developed land in order to preserve and conserve as much natural property and wild lands 
as possible.  As discussed in detail, there are many policy reasons for abolishing 
sovereign immunity from adverse possession for the government’s developed land.  The 
positive effects adverse possession has on private citizens could be equally as beneficial 
when applied to government land, it would promote the beneficial use of land while 
deterring property owners from letting their land stay vacant and idle.  Additionally, 
undeveloped property and wild lands must be preserved as it becomes scarcer in 
America.  As stated in this argument, adverse possession requirements are actually less 
strict for adverse possession of undeveloped land than they are for developed land and in 
order to preserve and conserve undeveloped land across the nation the adverse possession 
requirements must be the same for undeveloped land as it is for developed property.  The 
developed land in the United States must be used in the most beneficial manner possible 
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and the undeveloped land must be preserved and conserved, both of which can be 
accomplished by changing the rules of adverse possession.   
 
